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Abstract
This paper argues that large external imbalances pose signi￿cant macroeconomic
risks for New Zealand. While New Zealand has coped well in recent years, the global
￿nancial crisis has underlined the vulnerability of de￿cit countries to ￿nancial shocks.
New Zealand can draw important lessons from the global crisis by adjusting its macro-
economic policy framework to further mitigate the risks embedded in its international
balance sheet.
￿Prepared for New Zealand￿ s Macroeconomic Imbalances - Causes and Remedies: Policy Forum
(Wellington, 23-24 June 2011). I thank Peter McQuade for helpful research assistance, Norman Gem-
mell for his discussion and feedback from conference participants. I am also grateful to sta⁄ members
at the New Zealand Treasury, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and many independent economists for
helpful conversations and suggestions. This paper was written while I was an academic consultant to the
New Zealand Treasury. Email: plane@tcd.ie.1 Introduction
During the 2003-2007 period, there was a substantial increase in the global dispersion of
external imbalances (Lane 2010, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2011a). The rapid expansion
in cross-border investing was associated with greater optimism that ￿nancial globalisation
might have increased risk tolerance and thereby enabled the running of larger external
imbalances (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2008).
However, the global ￿nancial crisis since 2008 has provided renewed evidence that sud-
den stops in capital ￿ ows can generate extremely painful adjustment dynamics in countries
running excessive de￿cits. Those countries running the largest pre-crisis current account
de￿cits have been most likely to experience large declines in domestic output and domestic
demand (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2011a, 2011b). Large pre-crisis current account de￿cits
also contributed to the emergence of banking crises in several countries. Moreover, in some
cases, the sudden reversal in private capital ￿ ows has required several de￿cit countries to
seek o¢ cial assistance (Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Greece and Portugal among them).
In Europe, these painful lessons from the crisis have resulted in a major reform in the
European-level macroeconomic policy framework, with enhanced monitoring of external
imbalances and a requirement that countries take steps to correct excessive external de￿cits.
Similarly, there is an active debate among the G20 countries regarding the desirability of
placing limits on the scale of external de￿cits.
While New Zealand has performed well in adjusting to the global ￿nancial crisis, it
is timely to reconsider its macroeconomic policy framework with an eye to managing the
remaining risks in the external position and preparing for the likelihood of future ￿nancial
shocks. Accordingly, our focus in this paper is to review New Zealand￿ s international
balance sheet and lay out how the conduct of macroeconomic policy can mitigate the risks
embedded in external imbalances.
This paper is related to Edwards (2006), in that both studies are concerned with the
implications of New Zealand￿ s large external imbalances. However, relative to that contri-
bution, this paper focuses more on an analysis of the types of policy interventions than can
improve macroeconomic risk management. The connections between external imbalances
and macroeconomic policy are also extensively explored in Bedford (2008), Steenkamp
(2010) and Andre (2011).
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews New Zealand￿ s
1external balance sheet. Section 3 assesses the risk factors associated with large external
imbalances and argues that several types of distortions may justify policy interventions. In
turn, Section 4 addresses how the macroeconomic policy framework can manage external
risks. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 New Zealand￿ s External Balance Sheet
Figure 1 shows that New Zealand has run persistent and sizeable current account de￿cits
over the last forty years, ￿ uctuating around a mean of about 5 percent of GDP.1 In common
with the compression of the global distribution of current account balances during 2009-
2010, New Zealand￿ s de￿cit has declined in the last couple of years. However, global
projections are that structural external imbalances will re-emerge as the recovery in the
world economy takes hold (Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti 2010, Gagnon 2011).
In terms of the accumulated net liability position, Figure 2 shows that New Zealand
has a large net external liability position. While the net position is less negative than in
the mid-1990s, it has deteriorated from its local peak in 2000/2001.
Table 1 shows that New Zealand is among the most indebted countries in the set of
advanced economies. Many of the other countries in this group have experienced substantial
economic distress over the last several years. Furthermore, Table 2 shows that the net
foreign asset position for New Zealand has been relatively stable over the last decade, with
the euro periphery and emerging Europe catching up with it in the mid-2000s. In contrast,
emerging Asia and emerging Latin America have substantially improved their net external
positions during this period (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007, Lane and Shambaugh 2010).
Moreover, Figure 3 shows that the composition of the net liability position has shifted.
Whereas the net liability position in the mid-1990s was evenly distributed between net
equity and net debt, the net equity position is now much smaller and the net debt position
is much larger.2 In 2009-2010, the net debt position averaged about 66 percent of GDP,
which is much more negative than in previous phases. Table 3 shows an expansion in the
net debt position between 2002-2010, even if it smaller than the growth or level of the
net debt position in the euro periphery and or the growth in emerging Europe. However,
1Edwards (2006) provides a detailed description of the evolution of New Zealand￿ s external imbalances.
2This analysis is based on the international balance sheet data calculated following Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007). The o¢ cial data for New Zealand have a higher debt-equity ratio in the mid-1990s.
2it is in sharp contrast to other emerging regions that have have engineered signi￿cant
improvements in the equity-debt mix in their international balance sheets.
Probing further the composition of the debt component of the external position, Table
4 shows gross foreign debt liabilities and o¢ cial reserve assets in comparative perspective.
While New Zealand has slightly increased its reserve holdings, the ratio of reserves to
external debt liabilities is low relative to other emerging regions.3
In addition to examining net international balances, it is also important to assess the
overall extent of international ￿nancial integration in terms of gross holdings of foreign
assets and foreign liabilities (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2002, 2007). Figure 4 shows that
New Zealand is far more ￿nancially integrated now than was the case in previous decades.
This upward trend is similar to that experienced by other advanced economies, even if
the level of gross cross-border holdings does not approach the very high levels observed in
Western Europe (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007). Table 6 compares New Zealand to other
regions. Together with Australia, New Zealand shows an intermediate level of international
￿nancial integration, which is below Western European levels but signi￿cantly larger than
emerging regions.
In terms of the composition of the international balance sheet, Table 5 shows the levels
of assets and liabilities for the various foreign equity and foreign debt components. The
comparatively low levels of foreign equity liabilities and foreign debt assets are especially
striking. As indicated earlier, the low level of equity liabilities is in contrast to many
emerging regions which have undertaken reforms to shift the composition of capital in￿ ows
towards equity-type instruments (Faria et al 2007).
Finally, it is important to evaluate the size of the international balance sheet in the
context of the size of the domestic ￿nancial system (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2008, Obstfeld
et al 2010). A key domestic ￿nancial indicator is the level of domestic private credit (Beck
et al 2009). Table 7 shows that domestic private credit expanded rapidly in New Zealand
between 2002 and 2009, in with a similar trajectory for Australia. While the level of private
credit by 2009 was still substantially below the level reached in the euro periphery, it was
far ahead of the levels observed in other emerging regions. Indeed, emerging Asia saw a
decline in the private credit ratio between 2002 and 2009.
3The euro periphery hold very little by way of o¢ cial reserves. As members of a currency union, these
countries have access to the liquidity facilities of the European Central Bank and the bulk of their foreign
debt liabilities are in euro. Accordingly, there is little need to hold liquid foreign-currency reserves.
33 Risk Assessment
Relative to other countries that entered the global crisis period with a high external de￿cit,
New Zealand has performed relatively well. In part, this can be attributed to the strength
of its macroeconomic policy framework. In particular, monetary expansion and currency
depreciation provided an important cushion, without a threat to in￿ ation expectations
in view of the credibility of the in￿ ation targeting framework. On the ￿scal side, the low
outstanding level of public debt enabled New Zealand to also engage in ￿scal activism, with
the ￿scal balance switching from an average surplus of 3.8 percent of GDP in 2003-2008 to
an average de￿cit of 2.7 percent in 2009-2010.
However, despite this good performance, New Zealand￿ s external balance sheet still
poses several macroeconomic problems. In particular, there are two primary reasons to be
concerned about excessively-large external imbalances in net capital ￿ ows and accumulated
net foreign liabilities.4 First, large imbalances may distort the overall structure of the
economy, with a possible negative impact on long-term growth prospects. Second, large
de￿cits and high external debt levels leave a country exposed to the risk of a sudden stop
in capital ￿ ows, which in turn may generate a generalised macroeconomic crisis.
In relation to trend macroeconomic performance, Summers (1988) highlighted that large
net capital in￿ ows squeeze the domestic traded sector, with the long-term risk that capacity
losses in exporting are di¢ cult to reverse. Blanchard (2007) makes a similar point, arguing
that ￿nancial constraints mean that a contraction in tradables output during a period of
high domestic expenditure may not be easily reversed once the economy needs to make the
transition towards greater net exports.5
In addition, ￿learning by doing￿e⁄ects mean that a period of lower exporting activity
may permanently harm productivity levels in the traded sector. Indeed, this is the ￿ ip side
of the argument that subsidising exports can permanently improve productivity through
learning by doing (Korinek and Serven 2011).
The dynamics of large trade imbalances also create problems for the labour market.
Blanchard (2007) argues rigidities in nominal wages and prices may mean that there is
excessive volatility in employment in response to swings in the level of domestic demand.
4See also Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2010, 2011).
5See also Mabin (2011) for an analysis of how the exchange rate a⁄ects traded-sector production in New
Zealand.
4During a phase of trade de￿cits, the high level of domestic spending will drive up output
and employment in the nontraded sector. However, once the trade balance swings into
surplus, the lower level of domestic demand will map into employment reductions if there
is insu¢ cient downward ￿ exibility in nominal wages and prices.
In terms of mechanisms, a high level of net capital in￿ ows can induce real exchange
rate appreciation through the expansion in domestic demand for nontradables and domestic
goods. In turn, a strong real exchange rate is associated with a reduction in the pro￿tability
of exporters and a contraction in the relative size of the traded sector. Figure 6 charts the
real exchange rate for New Zealand. It shows very substantial real appreciation between
2002 and 2008, albeit with some partial reversal during the crisis.
In addition, a large outstanding stock of net liabilities can drive up the real interest
rate for several reasons. First, the expectation of future real exchange rate depreciation
requires a higher domestic real interest rate relative to foreign real interest rates. Second,
greater rollover risk and default risk means that the risk premium is increasing in the level
of net external debt. Similarly, a large current account de￿cit should be associated with a
higher monetary policy rate to the extent that a current account de￿cit is associated with
greater domestic demand pressures which pose a threat to price stability.
Figure 7 shows a scatter plot of the average long-term real interest rate against the
net external debt liability position for a sample of OECD countries over 2002-2009.6 The
cross-sectional correlation is signi￿cantly negative, with highly-indebted countries such as
New Zealand displaying substantially higher real interest rates than countries with more
positive external positions.7
In relation to crisis risk, Blanchard (2007) also highlights that high net in￿ ows may
increase the risk of a sudden stop and the attendant risk of ￿nancial distress. The empirical
literature shows that sudden stop are typically associated with signi￿cant output recessions
and large drops in domestic demand. Most recently, as is documented in Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2011a, 2011b), the incidence of the 2008-2009 global ￿nancial crisis (which featured
a sharp reduction in cross-border capital ￿ ows) was most severe in those countries with the
6This graph uses net external debt, since the net external equity position may be less directly prob-
lematic. Empirically, the interest rate is more correlated with net external debt than with the overall net
foreign asset position.
7See also Labuschagne and Vowles (2010) and Rose (2010) on the determinants of the real interest rate
in New Zealand.
5largest external imbalances during the pre-crisis period.
In terms of the New Zealand situation, Section 2 highlighted the high debt component
in its external liabilities. A high debt-equity ratio in the structure of external liabilities
increases the risks embedded in the external balance sheet. Equity liabilities do not o⁄er a
￿xed return and the foreign equity investor will receive a time-varying payo⁄, depending on
the performance of the underlying asset. In contrast, debt liabilities carry ￿xed obligations
in terms of interest and principal repayments. Moreover, the ￿xed maturity of most debt
instruments means that these involve rollover risk, which increases the fragility of the
external position.
For many countries, external debts are denominated in foreign currencies, such that a
high level of external debt also leaves the country exposed to currency movements. In partic-
ular, unexpected depreciation of the home currency raises the real value of foreign-currency
external debts and the adverse impact on balance sheets can generate macroeconomic and
￿nancial-sector problems.
Moreover, these macroeconomic risk factors are not internalised by individual ￿rms and
households, such that policy interventions may be required to address such distortions.
There is a large literature that provides models of external overborrowing by private-sector
entities, due to the externality e⁄ect by which individually-rational behaviour aggregates
into excessive levels of external debt due to these type of externalities (Korinek 2010 pro-
vides one recent example).
Given these possible distortions, New Zealand has taken several important steps to
mitigate external risks. First, it seems that New Zealand borrowers hedge much of the
foreign-currency risk associated with external debt.8 These hedges involve cross-border
risk transfers, since the main counterparties are foreign banks. So long as these hedging
opportunities are available at a reasonable price, this cross-border currency risk transfer
strategy certainly reduces the risk relative to a similar non-hedged level of foreign-currency
debt.
However, even if existing debts are hedged, New Zealand still remains exposed to a shift
in debt market sentiment that may limit the rollover of existing debt and the availability
of new debt ￿ ows. Moreover, the ongoing availability of reasonably-priced currency hedges
cannot be guaranteed. In particular, if market expectations of future currency deprecia-
tion become su¢ ciently strong, it will become more expensive to obtain protection against
8According to Statistics New Zealand, over 90 percent of the external debt is hedged.
6downward currency movements. Alternatively, shifts in the global ￿nancial sector may re-
duce the risk tolerance of those institutions currently o⁄ering such insurance-type products.
Similarly, adverse ￿nancial shocks elsewhere in the global system might induce these insti-
tutions to pull back from the New Zealand currency hedge market, through the operation
of international ￿nancial multiplier e⁄ects (Krugman 2008, Devereux and Yetman 2010,
Dedola and Lombardo 2011).
Similar arguments apply in relation to the ownership structure of the New Zealand
banking system. The dominant ownership share of Australian banks in the New Zealand
system provides important risk-sharing bene￿ts. In particular, in the event of sizeable
banking-sector losses, the equity capital provided by the Australian parent banks provides
an important bu⁄er and limits the exposure of New Zealand taxpayers. Moreover, concerns
about reputational capital mean that parent banks might be more likely to maintain lines
of credit to their New Zealand a¢ liates than would other international creditors.9
However, foreign-owned banks also involve some important risk exposures. First, if
the parent banks su⁄ered losses in their home markets or elsewhere and/or experienced
tighter conditions in funding markets, these negative shocks might impel the parent banks
to withdraw capital from overseas operations and limit their capacity to provide funding to
New Zealand a¢ liates. This is of particular concern in view of the common risks facing the
Australian and New Zealand economies, such that any ￿nancial shocks in Australia might
occur at the same time as similar shocks in New Zealand.
Finally, much of the external debt is intermediated through the banking system. These
liabilities fund domestic loans. Accordingly, a possible trigger for an external funding crisis
would be the emergence of signi￿cant loan losses and/or a decline in the quality of the
collateral backing these loans. In terms of domestic risk factors facing the banking system,
the elevated level of property prices (housing and farms) is a particular concern (see also
Andre 2011). Table 9 shows that property prices have declined considerably over 2008-
2010 in many countries that ran large current account de￿cits during the pre-crisis period,
even if the adjustment in New Zealand has been very limited so far.
9See also Bertram (2002).
74 Policy Options
How should the design of New Zealand￿ s policy framework be further adapted to manage
these external risks? It is possible to consider four dimensions of macroeconomic policy:
(a) monetary policy; (b) macro-prudential ￿nancial regulation; (c) structural economic
policies; and (d) ￿scal policy.
4.1 Monetary Policy
In relation to monetary policy, the Reserve Bank has several tools at its disposal. Its
primary policy instrument is the interest rate. In addition, for a given interest rate path,
it may conduct sterilised interventions to temporarily in￿ uence the exchange rate. In the
event of a ￿nancial crisis, it also has an important role in preserving ￿nancial stability
through its liquidity policies vis-a-vis the banking system and non-orthodox policies such
as quantitative easing or asset purchases. This may even extend to the management of
foreign-currency liquidity problems through the arrangement of currency swap agreements
with other central banks.
In terms of interest rate policy, it is not clear that there is strong case for a preventive
role in managing the risk of ￿nancial imbalances in the case of a country like New Zealand.
In essence, the magnitude of interest rate increases that would be necessary to kill o⁄
growth in ￿nancial risks would have a predictably large negative impact on output and
unemployment while having only an uncertain impact on ￿nancial variables (Assenmacher-
Wesche and Gerlach 2010, Doyle et al 2011). The strongest argument in favour of modifying
interest rate policy to guard against ￿nancial imbalances is that a prolonged period of very
low interest rates may encourage excessive risk taking (Rajan 2010). However, that concern
is not relevant for New Zealand, which has average interest rates substantially higher than
most other advanced economies.
Rather, it is appropriate to maintain the in￿ ation-targeting framework in setting interest
rates. Importantly, in the event of an incipient ￿nancial crisis, this does not prevent the
Reserve Bank from adopting an aggressive monetary policy, since an unchecked ￿nancial
crisis entails signi￿cant downside risks for in￿ ation and output.
In relation to sterilized intervention in the currency market, this can play a role in restor-
ing stability if short-term speculative pressures have pushed the currency to an excessively-
strong or excessively-weak value, by interrupting self-feeding momentum dynamics (Sarno
8and Taylor 2001). However, currency intervention has no in￿ uence over the medium-term
trend for the exchange rate, such that the impact of persistent external imbalances cannot
be undone through this type of policy.
Still, in the event of a ￿nancial crisis, the Reserve Bank has an extensive tool kit at its
disposal. In addition to aggressive conventional monetary policy, it may provide special
local-currency liquidity facilities to the banking system and, by arrangement with foreign
central banks, also resolve foreign-currency liquidity problems.10 It can also draw on the
lessons from other countries in terms of the potential value of non-orthodox policies such
as asset purchase schemes and quantitative easing.
4.2 Macro-Prudential Financial Regulation
A primary instrument for tackling some of the risks associated with excessive capital in￿ ows
is the macro-prudential regulation of the ￿nancial sector. Since the banking system is in
many cases the main intermediator of foreign capital ￿ ows, a regulatory regime that suc-
cessfully manages macro-prudential risk should address concerns about the vulnerabilities
embedded in the international balance sheet.
In particular, a basic ￿nancial-system risk is that an external de￿cit may fuel a domestic
credit boom and thereby raise the probability of a banking crisis. This risk can be mitigated
by suitable regulatory interventions by the domestic regulator to guard against excessive
credit growth, rather than necessarily directly targeting cross-border ￿ ows.11 There are
scenarios under which capital controls may also play a part in ￿nancial stabilisation (Ostry
et al 2010). However, the primary role of capital controls is in relation to surges in short-
term capital ￿ ows rather than the type of persistent de￿cits that has characterised the New
Zealand experience. Finally, macro-prudential regulation may place an extra risk weighting
on foreign-currency debt, regardless of whether the counterparties are foreign or domestic.
Moreover, ￿nancial regulation on its own is not su¢ cient to tackle external imbalances,
since corporations, the government and households may also accrue external liabilities
directly. Indeed, over-regulation of the domestic ￿nancial sector increases the incentives to
directly tap sources of foreign capital, via overseas banks, the international bond market
10The current European crisis underlines the importance of ensuring that the Reserve Bank only provides
liquidity support to solvent banks.
11Ha and Hodgetts (2011) evaluate the role of macro-prudential policy instruments in the New Zealand
context.
9and the issue of equity-type liabilities to foreign investors.
4.3 Structural Policies
In terms of structural economic policies, there are several sets of issues. First, the sus-
tainability of the external position is the greater, the better is the medium-term trend
for economic growth. Accordingly, a given level of external liabilities is less risky, the
brighter are the growth prospects for the economy. This provides additional motivation
for the government to pursue structural policies that are targeted at improving growth po-
tential. However, since the government already faces strong incentives to implement such
policies (since the domestic population is the main bene￿ciary of pro-growth policies), the
additional motivation provided by external stabilisation may be marginal.
Second, in the event of a sudden stop in net capital ￿ ows, the resilience of the New
Zealand economy in coping with such an adverse shock is improved by having a ￿ exible
labour market to facilitate adjustment in real wage levels. In addition, a stable and
developed ￿nancial system can help domestic ￿rms and households to absorb such shocks.12
Adjustment is further faciliated by a legal system that can e¢ ciently resolve debt overhang
problems at the levels of corporates and individuals. Finally, a well-organised resolution
regime for failing ￿nancial institutions is necessary to avoid excessive costs from ￿nancial
distress.
It is important to appreciate that the presence of such shock absorbers not only mitigates
the impact of a negative shock but also reduces the probability of a shock. In particular,
speculative dynamics may turn on projections concerning the perceived fragility of an
economy in handling a reversal of capital in￿ ows. If an economy lacks shock absorbers,
there is a stronger likelihood that a negative shock may be transformed into a full-blown
crisis. In turn, this induces investors to set a lower trigger point at which funding is pulled
from the country in question.
As with pro-growth policies, the government should already have strong incentives to
establish a robust set of shock absorbers to deal with domestic shocks. Again, the impor-
tance of resilience in the face of external ￿nancial shocks provides additional motivation
12One attribute is the capacity of solvent entitites to borrow to smooth out temporary income shocks.
However, ￿nancial policies may also be designed to encourage individuals to maintain a bu⁄er stock of
liquid assets to cope with ￿rainy day￿events.
10to implement such policies, to the extent that the existing institutional environment is
incomplete or inadequate.
However, there are some structural policies that are especially important in relation
to the international balance sheet. First, Section 2 highlighted the relatively low levels of
equity-type instruments in New Zealand￿ s external liabilities. Financial development poli-
cies that improve the attractiveness of New Zeland as a destination for equity investments
can help to reduce the riskiness of the external position (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2008).
Second, its reliance on foreign-currency debt means that New Zealand￿ s international ￿-
nancial diplomacy should be targeted at ensuring the availability of foreign currency swaps
and/or foreign-currency credit lines in the event of a crisis. Third, the sustainability of
the external position is improved by export-enhancing policies, such as trade facilitation
programmes that lower the costs of exporting and improve the capacity of non-exporters
to switch to exporting (Galstyan and Lane 2008).13 Finally, to the extent that the external
de￿cit in part re￿ ects low private-sector saving in New Zealand, well-designed pro-savings
policies may also be helpful.14
4.4 Fiscal Policy
Turning to the design and conduct of ￿scal policy, it has several potential roles in managing
external imbalances. First, ￿scal policy can target the external account in order to avoid
the emergence of excessive imbalances. Second, if the existing external position is deemed
to be non-optimal, ￿scal interventions can facilitate the external adjustment process to
return the external account to a sustainable level. Third, in the event of a crisis in the
external account, ￿scal policy can play a central role in crisis management.
4.4.1 Fiscal Policy and External Imbalances
In terms of pre-emptively limiting external imbalances or responding to an existing exces-
sive imbalance, ￿scal policy can operate through several mechanisms. In the standard
intertemporal model of the current account, a temporary decline in government spending
improves the current account balance, since households do not one-for-one increase pri-
vate spending in response to a temporary decline in public spending (Sachs 1982, Obstfeld
13See also Fabling et al (2009) on the determinants of exporting choices by New Zealand ￿rms.
14In relation to New Zealand, see the ￿nal report of the Savings Working Group (2011).
11and Rogo⁄ 1995). A similar pattern holds in the baseline ￿new open economy macro-
economics￿model (Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ 1996). A temporary contraction in government
consumption reduces domestic demand, improving the external balance and depreciation
of the real exchange rate.
In contrast, a permanent decline in government consumption has no impact on the cur-
rent account in the standard intertemporal model. Moreover, it generates a current account
de￿cit in the baseline ￿new open economy macroeconomics￿model, since the long-term
budget constraint means that households upwardly adjust private consumption. However,
the impact of permanent shifts in government spending more closely resemble the results for
temporary shocks once frictions are introduced into the dynamics of private consumption,
due to the role of habits in preferences or some related mechanism.
In order to combine external adjustment with the maintenance of full employment, an
economy must re-allocate labour from the nontraded sector to the traded sector. The
relative expansion of the traded sector is facilitated by depreciation of the real exchange
rate, which improves the competitiveness of export-orientated and import-competing ￿rms
and improves the relative pro￿tability of the traded sector relative to the nontraded sector.
In addition to currency depreciation, sectoral reallocation can also be facilitated by
￿scal policy. To the extent that government spending is concentrated on nontraded goods,
a contraction in public expenditure may be associated with a decline in the relative price
of nontradables and a real depreciation. As an example, government wage consumption
is a major component in public spending: the government is a major employer and a
decline in its demand for labour relieves pressure on the domestic labour market. In turn,
this increases the supply of labour to the traded sector and puts downward pressure on
wage levels. A similar mechanism applies to government purchases of consumption and
investment goods from the domestic private sector.
Blanchard (2007) shows how the timing of government spending on nontradables and
tradables may be optimally manipulated to limit the distortions induced by current ac-
count imbalances. However, an important message from his analysis is that the ￿scal
intervention may not necessarily alter the scale of the current account position - rather, the
policy focus should be on mitigating the associated distortions. For instance, if there is a
temporary surge in domestic consumption, rigidities in prices and wages may lead to an
excessive increase in employment in the nontraded sector: this can be o⁄set by a reduction
in government spending on nontradables, even if this intervention has no impact on the
12current account de￿cit.
Indeed, Blanchard shows that in some cases the optimal ￿scal response may actually
result in a larger current account de￿cit. Under conditions in which ￿nancial constraints
mean that it is damaging to tolerate a contraction in traded-sector output, the optimal
policy to a temporary increase in domestic consumption is to reduce government purchases
of nontradables and increase government purchases of tradables. This stems the contraction
of the tradables sector but does lead to an enlarged current account de￿cit.
It is noteworthy that the empirical evidence indicates a robust relation between gov-
ernment spending and the real exchange rate. At medium- and long-term horizons, the
cointegration analysis of Ricci et al (2008) and Galstyan and Lane (2009) shows that a
sustained decline in government consumption (relative to trading partners) is associated
with real depreciation.15 A similar result is obtained in annual data by Lane and Perotti
(2003). Furthermore, the evidence for Europe from VAR analyses is that a discretionary
negative shock to government spending is associated with real depreciation (Beetsma et al
2008, Benetrix and Lane 2009).16 17 Finally, Benetrix and Lane (2009) shows that the
impact of government spending on the real exchange rate varies across di⁄erent expendi-
ture categories, such that the composition of spending matters in assessing the sensitivity
of the real exchange rate to a ￿scal shock.
Taken together, these studies are suggestive that shifts in the level of government spend-
ing can contribute to the external adjustment process by in￿ uencing the path for the real
exchange rate. Consistent with this pattern, the VAR evidence for Europe provided by
Benetrix and Lane (2010) is that a relative decline in government spending is associated
15Galstyan and Lane (2009a, 2009b) also consider the long-run relation between public investment and
the real exchange rate. Since a higher stock of public capital may a⁄ect productivity in the traded and
nontraded sectors, its impact on the real exchange rate is ambiguous. In the data, there is little robust
evidence of a strong link between public investment and the real exchange rate.
16Beetsma et al (2008) consider an EU14 sample, whereas Benetrix and Lane (2009a) provide evidence
for an EMU11 group (the founding members of EMU, with the exception of Luxembourg) and Benetrix
and Lane (2009b) report results from a country study for Ireland.
17It is striking that some studies (Monacelli and Perotti 2009, Ravn et al 2009) ￿nd the opposite pattern
(a decline in government spending being associated with real appreciation) for a sample consisting of
the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. However, Benetrix and Lane (2009b) argue
that likely re￿ ects a data pattern for this group of ￿ oating-currency countries by which the same type
of economic news that induces a government to engage in ￿scal expansion also leads to a sell o⁄ in the
currency market.
13with a relative contraction in the size of the nontraded sector and an improvement in the
trade balance. Similar results for the trade balance are also reported by Lane and Perotti
(1998) and Beetsma et al (2008).
So far, we have discussed shifts in the level and composition of government spending.
In addition, the ￿nancing of the ￿scal position is also relevant. In particular, if the main
distortionary impact of a current account de￿cit relates to the enhanced risk of a sudden
stop, the optimal ￿scal policy indeed involves a reduction in the current account de￿cit.
While there is no direct co-movement between the ￿scal balance and the external balance
under Ricardian Equivalence conditions, a reduction in public debt may be associated with
a reduction in external debt if these conditions do not hold.
For instance, Ganelli (2005) and Kumhof and Laxton (2009) provide models in which
households have ￿nite horizons, such that a debt-reducing tax increase reduces the wealth
of currently-alive cohorts, reducing consumption and generating a current account surplus.
Furthermore, Corsetti and Muller (2006) show that the addition of an investment channel
reinforces the pass through from a ￿scal surplus to an external surplus in the case of
persistent surpluses, especially for more open economies.
Kumhof and Laxton (2009) also show qualitatively-similar results apply in relation to
a temporary decline in the ￿scal de￿cit even in an in￿nite-horizon framework if some pro-
portion of households are credit constrained. Under these conditions, a debt-reducing
tax increase reduces the current consumption of credit-constrained or hand-to-mouth con-
sumers, leading to a current account surplus.18
In relation to the connection between public debt and the net foreign asset position is
provided by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002). These authors model the long-run evolution
of the net foreign asset position as a function of relative output per capita, relative de-
mographic pro￿les and relative levels of public debt. For a panel of advanced economies,
there is a signi￿cant association between public debt and the net external debt but the
pass through is limited at around 0.11. In contrast, the pass through is much stronger for
a panel of developing countries with a coe¢ cient of about 0.66. The more powerful e⁄ect
in the latter group is in line with theories that emphasise the role of credit constraints
18These authors also show that the impact of a permanent reduction in public debt di⁄ers across the
two approaches. In the ￿nite-horizon model, the long-run stock of net external liabilities declines. In
contrast, the reduced savings of non-constrained households fully o⁄sets increased government savings in
the long-run in the in￿nite-horizon model.
14in explaining deviations from the Ricardian Equivalence benchmark, in view of the more
limited level of ￿nancial development in the less-advanced economies.
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2011b) provide further evidence of a robust comovement pat-
tern between the ￿scal balance and the current account balance. That study provides
cross-country panel ￿xed-e⁄ects estimates of the determinants of medium-term current
account balances over 1969-2008 with a partial coe¢ cent of 0.24 on the ￿scal balance.
In addition to the macroeconomic dimensions of ￿scal policy, there may also be a role
for speci￿c microeconomic interventions in aiding external adjustment. For instance, a
reduction in employment taxes contributes to real depreciation by lowering the cost of
domestic labour (Calmfors 2003). A further type of microeconomic intervention is to alter
the timing of consumption decisions through subsidies to saving schemes, which mimics the
impact of a shift in the interest rate.19 While such interventions may be hard to implement
in relation to minor and transitory imbalances, these may be worth pursuing in tackling
larger-scale and persistent de￿cits.
In terms of the government￿ s ￿nancial strategy, there is a risk that the occurrence of
a ￿nancial crisis may compromise a government￿ s ability to borrow. Beyond setting a
prudentially-low target level for the public debt, an alternative approach is to divert some
revenues into a dedicated rainy-day fund that would be invested in liquid assets. In turn,
such liquidity may prove useful in dealing with the fallout from a banking crisis and/or
reduce the risk of a funding crisis by providing assurance to investors.20 Recent proposals to
tax bank pro￿ts in order to accumulate an insurance fund are similar in terms of objectives.
In relation to the feasibility of targeting the external account, the persistent nature of
current account positions (at least in recent years) means that timing lags do not provide
a prohibitive objection. A basic problem is in identifying the episodes in which policy
intervention may be warranted, since it is unlikely that a simple rules-based approach can
properly di⁄erentiate between ￿desirable￿and ￿undesirable￿levels of net capital in￿ ows.
To this end, the current generation of models of equilibrium current account balances
and equilibrium real exchange rates provide only a very broad and imprecise guide to
the sustainability of a given external balance.21 However, the main risks are associated
19A cyclically-focused scheme would specify a subsidy schedule that was conditioned on cyclical indica-
tors.
20 See also Lane (2011a, 2011b).
21The state of the art is represented by Ricci et al (2008).
15with large external de￿cits and it may be possible to establish threshold indicators, such
that ￿scal policy responds in a non-linear fashion to the emergence of de￿cits that enter a
￿danger zone.￿
4.4.2 Fiscal Policy and Crisis Management
In the event of an external adjustment problem that is coupled with a ￿nancial crisis, the
public balance sheet may be transformed by rescue operations that act to transfer assets and
liabilities from the private sector to the government or to increase the contingent liabilities
of the government through the provision of guarantees and insurance to private entities
(see also Lane 2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 2011b).22 This may be the result of a publicly-￿nanced
restructuring of the balance sheets of the banking system, the corporate sector and/or the
household sector. In some cases, the costs of such bailouts may feed directly into the ￿scal
balance; in others, the main costs may remain ￿o⁄ balance sheet.￿ Under either scenario,
the impact on the public balance sheet may a⁄ect funding costs for the government and
a⁄ect choices over public spending and taxation.
In relation to the external position, the assumption of foreign liabilities by the govern-
ment typically reduces the expected losses to foreign creditors on distressed debt.23 The
long-term horizon of the government means that it may be better able to withstand short-
term declines in the market value of assets, although at the cost of increased direct risk to
the taxpayer if the ultimate return on these assets fail to meet expectations.
If external liabilities are mainly denominated in foreign currency, the government takes
on substantial currency risk if it acquires foreign liabilities from the private sector. This
risk can be mitigated by holding foreign-currency liquid assets (whether reserves or in a
sovereign rainy-day fund).
22See Honohan and Klingbiel (2003) and Honohan (2008) on the factors that determine the ￿scal cost of
a banking crisis. These studies highlight that the ￿scal cost vary widely, depending on the policy choices
made by the government.
23In some cases, the government may also acquire foreign assets. Examples include the nationalisation of
a bank with international operations and the establishment of an asset management agency that acquires
non-performing (domestic and foreign) loans from the domestic banking system.
164.4.3 E⁄ectiveness of Fiscal Policy
In order for ￿scal policy to be helpful in external adjustment or as a preventive measure to
forestall unsustainable imbalances, it must be the case that ￿scal policy can be e⁄ectively
deployed. In this regard, there are several concerns.
First, if ￿scal policy is to be e⁄ective as a stabilisation instrument, the long-term ￿scal
position must be clearly sustainable. Otherwise, interventions that raise the ￿scal de￿cit
may lead to concerns among investors and taxpayers, with an attendant increase in funding
risk and the size of the risk premium. This is especially important for countries with
substantial external liabilities, such that the ￿safe￿ public debt ratio is lower for such
countries.
As is shown in Figure 5 and Table 8, New Zealand successfully attained a comparatively
low public debt ratio prior to the crisis, bringing the public debt ratio from its 1987 peak
of 75.5 percent of GDP to 20.7 percent of GDP in 2008. This allowed it to engage in
￿scal expansion during the crisis period without raising concerns about ￿scal sustainability.
However, the debt ratio has climbed to 31.1 percent of GDP in 2010, such that there is
medium-term need to return the public debt ratio to a prudently-low target level.
Reinhart and Rogo⁄(2009) have shown that public debt ratios can rapidly climb in the
wake of a ￿nancial crisis. Moreover, the current European ￿scal crisis also demonstrates
this pattern (Lane 2011b). Accordingly, the lesson is that the appropriate target public
debt ratio may have downwardly shifted in the wake of the global crisis (Lane 2010b).
Second, an important potental limitation is whether ￿scal interventions can be timed
correctly. Decision lags and implementation lags mean that ￿scal policy is not suitable for
the management of transitory shocks. However, these concerns are much less relevant in
the case of chronic risk factors such as persistently-large current account de￿cits or a high
outstanding stock of external liabilities which call for medium-term ￿scal interventions.
Third, various political distortions may act against a stabilising role for ￿scal policy.
There is considerable evidence that the discretionary component of ￿scal policy is pro-
cyclical in many countries (see, amongst others, Lane 2003 and Alesina et al 2008). If ￿scal
policy is not stabilising vis-a-vis the domestic business cycle, it may be similarly di¢ cult
to implement ￿scal measures that seek to ￿lean against the wind￿vis-a-vis the external
account.
This pattern raises doubts about whether ￿scal policy could indeed be employed to
17￿lean against the wind￿ in relation to the direction of net capital ￿ ows. Furthermore,
there is a non-trivial risk of a de-stabilising ￿scal response, since inward capital ￿ ows may
generate a windfall in tax revenues due to upward pressure on domestic asset prices and
an increased level of transactions in domestic asset markets. If the political system fails to
save these windfall revenues, an increase in government spending or a reduction in taxes
may further amplify the shock to the domestic economy.
The importance of asset prices and wealth shocks for tax revenues has been documented
for a panel of countries by Eschenbach and Schuknecht (2004). In the Irish case, Addison-
Smyth and McQuinn (2009) calculate a substantial tax windfall from the 2002-2007 housing
boom in Ireland that was fuelled by capital in￿ ows. More broadly, Benetrix and Lane
(2011) show for a large panel of countries that current account de￿cits place negative
pressure on ￿scal balances, with public spending growing more quickly than tax revenues.
Finally, Parkyn (2010) shows how asset price and terms of trade shocks a⁄ect the cyclical
behaviour of ￿scal balances in New Zealand.
Fourth, stabilisation of the external account may not receive a large weight in the
objective function of policymakers. There are many competing pressures on the allocation
of ￿scal resources and the determination of overall spending and taxation levels, such that
it may be di¢ cult to push ￿scal policy in the direction required for external stabilisation.
4.4.4 A Formal Fiscal Framework
Taken together, these considerations reinforce the importance of a well-designed institu-
tional framework for the conduct of ￿scal policy.24 Such a framework has two main macro-
economic components: (i) a set of numerical ￿scal rules; and (ii) a monitoring role for an
independent ￿scal council.
The over-riding principle in designing ￿scal rules should be to preserve medium-term
￿scal sustainability by ensuring that the level of public debt converges on a ￿safe￿ low
steady-state level and is maintained at the level over the medium term. In addition, ￿scal
policy can be insulated from pro-cyclical pressures by a set of rules that require the gov-
ernment to achieve a target for the structural balance over the cycle. A through-the-cycle
target provides the ￿ exibility to address major recessions or (in the other direction) over-
heating episodes, which may require extra ￿scal measures beyond the automatic stabilisers
24For an extensive analysis that focuses on the New Zealand situation, see Brook (2011).
18that are part of the passive cyclical component of the budget.
Fiscal rules are more e⁄ective if the setting of ￿scal policy incorporates a role for an
independent ￿scal council that can monitor compliance with the rules. Furthermore, an
independent ￿scal council can make other contributions. First, such a council can play a role
in identifying the cyclical state of the economy and the distribution of macroeconomic risk
factors. Second, given the macroeconomic environment, it could make recommendations
concerning the overall budgetary stance that would be consistent with medium-term ￿scal
sustainability. Third, it could make an ex-post evaluation of the conduct of ￿scal policy
over the preceding year.
However, Calmfors and Wren-Lewis (2011) warn that an independent ￿scal council is
only sustainable and e⁄ective if its role is fully supported by the political system. Other-
wise, a government may be tempted to neutralise an independent council (for instance by
reducing its budget or replacing its sta⁄) if it dislikes the ￿scal opinions that it provides.
In addition, the e⁄ectiveness of such an independent agency depends on the clarity of its
mandate and its capacity to act in an autonomous fashion.
Taken together, these considerations reinforce the importance of a well-designed institu-
tional framework for the conduct of ￿scal policy. While the literature on independent ￿scal
councils has largely focused on output stabilisation, such a council could also assess the
appropriate ￿scal stance in guarding against risks that may be embedded in the ￿nancial
system and in the external position (Lane 2010a, Lane 2010b).
In relation to ￿nancial stability, Levine (2011) and Barth et al (2012) advocate a similar-
type independent council for the evaluation of ￿nancial regulation. Such an agency would be
independent of both the political system and ￿nancial markets, with its sole responsibility
being to provide a critical assessment of ￿nancial-sector policies. To be e⁄ective, it would
have to have the power to obtain any information necessary for evaluating the state of
￿nancial regulation.
Accordingly, a dual set of independent agencies to provide rigorous monitoring of ￿scal
policy and ￿nancial regulation may have the potential to help deliver superior policy out-
comes. At least for smaller ecoomies where the available expertise is quite limited, an open
question is whether these di⁄erent roles might be successfully performed by a combined,
single independent council.
195 Conclusions
This paper has emphasised that New Zealand￿ s external imbalances should in￿ uence the de-
sign and conduct of its macroeconomic policies. In terms of growth performance, excessive
external de￿cits limit the size of the tradables sector and thereby constrains productivity
growth. In terms of stability, a large stock of external liabilities leaves New Zealand exposed
to disruptive ￿nancial shocks. Although it is hard to attach a probability to these shocks, a
prudential approach to policymaking requires putting substantial weight on low-probability
but high-impact scenarios.
In terms of policy design, we have highlighted that several dimensions of macroeconomic
policy can help to mitigate the negative impact of excessive external de￿cits. However, our
primary emphasis has been on role of ￿scal policy in managing these risks. In particular,
we have argued that the external risks call for a low medium-target for the public debt
ratio, an activist ￿scal approach to limiting the scale of net capital in￿ ows and the use of
￿scal instruments to facilitate external adjustment.
Finally, we have argued that the adoption of a formal ￿scal framework can also help
in managing external risks. An institutional commitment to maintaining a low target
public debt and running a counter-cyclical ￿scal policy provides reassurance to international
investors, while an independent ￿scal council can add credibility by monitoring compliance
with numerical ￿scal rules and providing an independent assessment of the evolving external
and domestic macroeconomics risks facing New Zealand.
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27Table 1: Evolution of Net Foreign Asset Positions
2002 2007 2010
New Zealand -84 -87 -87
Australia -53 -60 -65
Euro Periphery -48 -77 -101
Emerging Latin America -47 -24 -21
Emerging Asia -15 0 16
Emerging Europe -35 -65 -73
Sources: Updated version of dataset reported by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007); group
calculations from Brown and Lane (2011).












Source: Updated version of dataset reported by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
29Table 3: Net Foreign Debt and Net Foreign Equity Positions
Net Debt Net Equity
2002 2007 2010 2002 2007 2010
New Zealand -55 -60 -63 -28 -27 -23
Australia -41 -49 -47 -11 -12 -17
Euro Periphery -39 -69 -91 -19 -26 -11
Emerging Latn America -23 3 4 -24 -27 -25
Emerging Asia 0 27 36 -14 -27 -19
Emerging Europe -2 -18 -25 -34 -47 -47
Note: This table reports net external debt (international debt assets plus foreign exchange
reserves minus international debt liabilities) and net foreign equity (portfolio equity assets
plus FDI assets minus sum of portfolio equity liabilities and FDI liabilities), expressed as
percentages of GDP. Source: Updated version of dataset reported by Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007); group calculations from Brown and Lane (2011).
30Table 4: Gross Foreign Debt and O¢ cial Reserve Assets
Gross Debt FX Reserves
2002 2007 2010 2002 2007 2010
New Zealand 91 91 96 8 13 12
Australia 62 77 92 5 3 3
Euro Periphery 184 315 367 6 0 1
Emerging Latin America 61 34 28 10 13 14
Emerging Asia 46 37 33 29 36 43
Emerging Europe 46 71 84 21 20 20
Note: This table reports gross external debt (international portfolio and other debt liabili-
ties) and o¢ cial reserve assets, expressed as percentages of GDP. Source: Updated version
of dataset reported by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007); group calculations from Brown and
Lane (2011).
31Table 5: International Balance Sheet
2002 2007 2010
Assets
Portfolio Equity 15 21 21
FDI 15 12 13
O¢ cial Reserves 8 13 12
Portfolio Debt 9 6 8
Other Debt 18 12 12
Liabilities
Portfolio Equity 9 10 7
FDI 49 51 50
Portfolio Debt 46 45 46
Other Debt 44 47 50
Source: Updated version of dataset reported by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
32Table 6: International Financial Integration
2002 2007 2009
New Zealand 227 227 253
Australia 188 245 251
Euro Periphery 593 927 1063
Emerging Latin America 142 126 133
Emerging Asia 133 182 192
Emerging Europe 132 214 244
Source: Updated version of dataset reported by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007); group
calculations from Brown and Lane (2011).
33Table 7: Private Domestic Credit
2002 2007 2009
New Zealand 109 140 153
Australia 87 114 130
Euro Periphery 99 149 181
Emerging Latin America 30 33 44
Emerging Asia 78 60 53
Emerging Europe 28 54 75
Note: This table reports private credit by deposit money banks and other ￿nancial insti-
tutions as a percentage of GDP. Source: Beck et al (2009); group calculations from Brown
and Lane (2011).
34Table 8: Government Debt Ratios
2002 2007 2009
New Zealand 28 17 26
Australia 15 9 18
Euro Periphery 61 55 78
Emerging Latin America 75 46 44
Emerging Asia 47 38 42
Emerging Europe 32 25 35
Note: This table reports private credit by deposit money banks and other ￿nancial insti-
tutions as a percentage of GDP. Source: IMF; group calculations from Brown and Lane
(2011).




















































































































Current Account to GDP


















































































































Net Foreign Assets to GDP
Figure 2: Net Foreign Asset Position. Note: Expressed as a ratio to GDP. Source: Update







































































































Net Equity Net Debt
Net Equity and Net Debt to GDP
Figure 3: Net Foreign Equity and Net Foreign Debt Positions.Source: Update on dataset











































































































International Financial Integration Ratio to GDP
Figure 4: International Financial Integration Ratio. Source: Update on dataset reported





































































































Public Debt to GDP





































































































Real Effective Exchange Rate
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Net Debt to GDP
Figure 7: Scatter of Real Interest Rate Against Net External Debt. Source: OECD for
interest rates and in￿ ation. Source: Update on dataset reported in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2007).
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